Posts Tagged ‘Thatcher’

Thatcher a murit, si mama ce-o mai plang romanii religiosi

Aprilie 8, 2013

„Until industrial feudalism is replaced by industrial democracy, politics will be the shadow cast on society by big business.”

~John Dewey

Hai sa luam o pauza cu „so” ierte Dumnezeu si marfa ar fi daca voi crestinilor ati invata sa scrieti corect romaneste (s-o), si sa ne uitam la FAPTE.
-Thatcher a mostenit o tara cu un somaj de 1 milion
-Sub politicile ei somajul a crescut pana la aproape 4 milioane
-Inflatie a crescut si ea, dobanda ajungand pana la 15%
-A reusit sa dubleze numarul copiilor traind in saracie la 28%
-Sub politicile ei salariile au fost inghetate si reduse
-Thatcher a reusit sa dezindustrializeze tara, sa mareasca discrepanta dintre saraci si bogati, a reusit sa creeze o clasa de mijloc nesindicalizata, fortata sa accepte ore mai lungi de munca, salarii mai mici; iar lumea era prea speriata sa protesteze de frica lipsei locurilor de munca
-Pe langa asta, Thatcher alaturi de SUA a contribut la moartea a 2 milioane de oameni in Cambodia, datorat asa zisului Year Zero. Recomand sa cititi investigatia lui John Pilger, Cum Thatcher i-a dat o mana de ajutor lui Pol Pot:

-Thatcher alaturi de Mitterand si Reagan au creat un trio al neoliberalismului. Ceea ce vedeti in sistemul trans-atlantic, in special in Europa, este mostenirea politicilor acestor 3 adepti ai neoliberalismului. Mostenirea lor se bazeaza pe religiozitate economica (pe mituri), pe alienarea clasei de mijloc, crearea de saraci si de somaj, salarii mici, austeritate, ore lungi de munca, si profituri uriase pentru corporatisti. Statu cvoul nu doreste full employment, deoarece somajul pune presiune pe salarii sa ramana mici, si sa nu tina pas cu productivitatea muncii. „Daca nu-ti convine, pleaca! Pe postul asta mai sunt 1000 ca tine.” Lor nu le place sa fie in situatia inversa. „Ma angajezi azi? Ca mai sunt o gramada de patroni la care ma pot duce.”

Corporatiile nu vor sa auda de costuri, de acoperire de sanatate samd. Toti vor profituri uriase cu efort minim.

Faza ca ea a salvat tara de la faliment este o minciuna abjecta. Un guvern cu suveranitate monetara, indatoriat in propria moneda NU poate sa dea faliment. Marea Britanie este un astfel de stat, precum SUA, Japonia, Turcia, Pakistan, India, Cuba, Israel, Iran, Elvetia etc.
Deficitul guvernmanetal este egal cu economisirea neta a sistemului privat. Singurul mod prin care sistemul privat poate economisi, este ca guvernul sa ruleze un deficit fiscal. Guvernul creeaza fiat prin circularea monedei in cheltuielile sale guvernamentale, si o distruge via taxare. Taxele NU finanteaza cheltuielile publice. Taxarea permite activitatea economica sa se petreaca intr-un mediu non-inflationar.
MIT: Deficitele guvernamentalea fura credit ce-ar putea fi folosit de mediul privat.
MIT: Deficitele guvernamentale maresc dobanzile in piata.
MIT: Guvernul trebuie sa-si taxeze propria moneda inainte s-o cheltuiasca.
MIT: Dobanzile mici produc inflatie.

Adevar: Cererea agregata creeaza productie. Producatorii nu pot produce, daca nu pot vinde. Si ei nu pot vinde, daca noi nu putem cumpara. Cererea agregata se creeaza prin marirea deficitului fiscal indeajuns de mult pentru a satisface nevoia sectorului privat de a economisi. Orice tara net exportatoare este o net importatoare de cerere agregata.
Atat timp cat exista forta de munca disponibila/somaj (oameni care vor sa munceasca) si resurse neutilizate, guvernul fie taxeza prea mult, fie cheltuie prea putin, sau ambele. Dobanzile de 0% NU produc inflatie. Nu exista dovezi empirice in acest sense. Japonia practic a rulat dobanzi de 0% timp de mai bine de un deceniu, si tot a avut deflatie. De ce? Fiindca Quantitative Easing fara stimulus fiscal NU conduce la crearea de noi imprumuturi/la activarea consumului.

Why Margaret Thatcher was bad for Britain

by Ian Jones

When Margaret Thatcher left Downing Street for the last time as prime minister in November 1990, she told the press: „We’re very happy that we leave the United Kingdom in a very, very much better state than when we came here 11-and-a-half years ago.”

Judged against certain criteria, she had a point. Few enjoy paying tax: her time in No 10 saw the basic rate fall from 33p to 25p and the top rate plunge from 83p to 40p. Everybody enjoys more disposable income: during her premiership, the average salary rose from £5,427 to £15,252. She also oversaw a decline in the annual number of working days lost in strikes from 29.5m to 1.9m.

Dig beneath the surface of these statistics, however, and a different picture emerges. In order to achieve constructive changes, Mrs Thatcher subjected Britain to a sequence of destructive upheavals. Her cure for the UK’s ills was attractive enough for a portion of its population to vote her into office three times, but the medicine was so objectionable she never received majority support.

In short, the apparatus she used to achieve her goals harmed just as many – if not more – than they helped. This was because her policies tended to involve short-term pain for many, but long-term gain for only a few.

Inflation doubled

Rather than stimulating the economy through investment and tax cuts, she tried to control the amount of money in circulation. Mrs Thatcher thought this would reduce inflation from its 1979 level of 10.3%. It didn’t. Inflation doubled within a year and only fell to present day levels of 2-3% in 1986.

By this point, the damage had been done. To get to such a low level, indirect taxes had been hiked (VAT rose from 8% to 15%), as had interest rates (topping 17%). Subsidies for industry were reduced. The result was a massive rise in unemployment from 1.4m in 1979 to 3.5m by 1982, or one in eight people out of work. „I knew that when you change from one set of policies to another, the transition is very difficult,” Mrs Thatcher later reflected, „but benefits would come in the longer run.”

A disunited kingdom

Benefits did come, but not for everyone. Long-term unemployment blighted an entire generation in Northern Ireland (where 20% of people were left out of work), Scotland and the NE and NW of England (16%). Supporters insisted work was there to be found; critics argued it was unreasonable to expect people to leave homes and families to take a job 100 miles away.

A disunited kingdom emerged, as some parts of the country flourished while others faltered. Industry declined in the north; new sectors such as financial services boomed in the south. Mrs Thatcher went further, advocating both economic and moral belligerence. There was „no such thing as society, there are individual men and women and there are families.” People should look to their own and not rely on the government for help.

This crystallised into her observation that the only reason the Good Samaritan did any good was „because he had money”. Fine: everyone wants money and some made a lot during the Thatcher years, but what if you happened to live in a place where you couldn’t earn any?

Selective prosperity

The prosperity Mrs Thatcher brought to Britain was selective, antagonistic and temporary. She did indeed leave Britain „very, very much better”, but only for some. She also left it in recession, with unemployment, inflation and interest rates rising.

Above all, not only was she bad for the country during her premiership, she continues to be bad for the country today. The causes of the present slump – unrestricted credit, deregulation and too much financial speculation – all date back to the 1980s. No successive government dared reverse these decisions: a blessing to her legacy, but a curse we must now all share.



Tariq Ali: The Rotten Heart of Europe

Noiembrie 5, 2012